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ABSTRACT 
The causal Bayesian approach is based on the 
assumption that effects (e.g., symptoms) that are not 
conditionally independent with respect to some causal 
agent (e.g., a disease) are conditionally independent 
with respect to some intermediate state caused by the 
agent, (e.g., a pathological condition). This paper 
describes the development of a causal Bayesian model 
for the diagnosis of appendicitis. The paper begins with 
a description of the standard Bayesian approach to rea­
soning about uncertainty and the major critiques it 
faces. The paper then lays the theoretical groundwork. 
for the causal extension of the Bayesian approach, and 
details specific improvements we have developed. The 
paper then goes on to describe our knowledge engineer­
ing and implementation and the results of a test of the 
system. The paper concludes with a discussion of how 
the causal Bayesian approach deals with the criticisms 
of the standard Bayesian model and why it is superior 
to alternative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty 
popular in the AI community. 
1. I�TRODCCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Medical diagnosis is one of the major foci of 
work on reasoning about uncertainty in artificial intelli­
gence. It is the problem of how optimally to combine 
evidence from outwardly visible patient symptoms and 
signs to make the best inference about underlying or 
invisible disease causes, by using expert knowledge of 
the relative strengths of the links between causes and 
effects. The situation is complicated because each 
cause has multiple effects and several causes may pro­
duce the same effect Also, certain effects are highly 
intercorrelated, so that treating them as independent may 
lead to diagnostic errors. Finally, the utility of treat­
ment decisions varies among possible diseases, so that 
the most rational treatment decision does not necessarily 
treat the most probable disease. Effective methods of 
diagnosis should provide enough information to allow 
the best treatment choice for a given patient. 
It may take a physician a lifetime to develop 
advanced diagnostic expertise in a particular medical 
specialty. Expert diagnosticians perform well because 
they have learned much about the placement and 
strengths of the links between causes and effects in the 
disease process (Clarke, 1982; Elstein, Shulman, & 
Sprafka, 1978). However, this does not imply that they 
have a superior calculus or set of production rules for 
reasoning about uncertainty. A large body of psycho­
logical research (recent reviews are Baron, 1985; 
Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980) suggests that people reason about uncertainty 
using simplifying heuristics and strategies, which com­
monly lead to biased judgements. Physicians, as peo­
ple, are subject to the same reasoning biases (Berwick, 
Fineberg, & Weinstein, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski & 
Bushyhead, 1981; Detmer, Fryback, & Gassner, 1978; 
Eddy, 1982). 
If a physician's probabilistic knowledge is 
extracted and combined using a normative calculus, it 
can result in a diagnostic accuracy better than that of 
the physician (Clarke, 1984). (This "bootstrapping" 
phenomenon has a long tradition in psychology, see, for 
example, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Our goal as 
applied scientists, in designing an expert system, should 
be to use our best theories about normative reasoning to 
design an inference engine, which can be combined 
with a knowledge base obtained from an expert who has 
extended experience observing a domain. The purpose 
of this paper is: 
1) 
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to show why we think the causal Bayesian 
approach provides the most normative basis for 
an inference engine for reasoning about uncer­
tainty . 
2) to give an example of an implementation. 
2. ST Aj\:DARD BAYESIAN ASSUMPTIONS AND 
CRITIQUES 
Bayes theorem provides a good starting point for 
the design of an ideal inference engine because it has a 
firm foundation in the axioms of subjective probability 
(Savage, 1954). The standard form of Bayes theorem 
calculates the conditional probability of a cause 
(disease) given effects (symptoms) in terms of the pro­
babilities of the diseases (priors) and the probabilities of 
the symptoms given the diseases (likelihoods). The for­
mula, as applied to a single symptom, is as follows: 
--..P_(s_I_D .... )...,P_(_D._i )_ p(Djls) = 1,.. 
L p(s!D;) p(D;) 
i=-l 
Here the D's refer to diseases, s is a particular symp­
tom, and D i is the disease of interest. 
The formula becomes more complicated for the 
conditional probability of a disease given more than one 
symptom. For example, the equation to find the poste­
rior probability of disease Di when symptom St is 
added to the k-1 known symptoms is: 
p(Dils1&sz · · · &s,) = 
p(s1 Di&s,&sz · · · &sH) p(Djls,&sz · · · &s.�:-�) 
!,p(s11D;&s1&s2 • • • &sl-!)p(D;) 
i�l 
This means that to build a complete Bayesian system 
containing k symptoms and n diseases, it would be 
necessary to store likelihoods of each symptom given all 
combinations of from one to k-l other symptoms with 
each of the n diseases. Therefore, traditional Bayesian 
diagnostic systems of sufficient scope to be useful in 
multiple disease situations are quite often difficult to 
implement, as has been repeatedly pointed out in 
reviews of the literature on computer-based diagnostic 
systems (Charniak & McDermott, 1985; Hayes-Roth, 
Waterman, & Lenat, 1983; Kleinmuntz, 1984; 
Schaffner, 1981). 
2.1. ASSUMPTION OF SYMPTOM INDEPEN· 
DENCE 
The practicality of Bayesian systems can be 
improved by assuming symptom independence, thereby 
reducing the size of the set of symptom likelihoods that 
need to be known beforehand. Symptom independence 
is expressed through the following two assumptions: 
p(si lsi) = p(s;) 
p (sJD&sj) = p (sJD) 
The first says that the probability of observing symptom 
s; in the subpopulation of individuals with symptom si 
is the same as the probability of observing symptom si 
in the whole universe. The second says that the proba­
bility of observing symptom s; in the subpopulation of 
individuals with disease. D and symptom si is the same 
as the probability of observing symptom s; among all 
individuals with disease D. The upshot is these 
assumptions is that it is necessary to store likelihoods of 
only individual symptoms given diseases because the 
likelihood of two or more symptoms occurring together 
given a disease can be obtained by multiplying the indi­
vidual likelihoods as follows: 
1:1< 
p(Dj) IJp(sriDj) 
1=1 p(Djls1&sz · · · &s.) = ""z'"'=.t,-,-i=��_...;.,..;;...._ __ _ 
ll L,p(s1fD;)p(D;) 
1=1 i=l 
The justification for these independence assump­
tions is questionable. Although the medical AI litera­
ture reports examples of independence-assuming Baye­
sian medical systems (reviewed in deDombal, 1979; 
Wardle & Wardle, 197&) having diagnostic accuracies 
of over 90%, it is apparent that symptoms are not usu­
ally independent of each other in the real world, 
because the probability of two symptoms of the same 
disease occurring together, given that one has the 
disease, is often much higher than the product of the 
individual probabilities of the symptoms. If someone 
has a headache, knowing that it was caused by a cold 
makes a simultaneous sore throat more likely. Monte 
Carlo studies by Russek, Kronmal, and Fisher (1983) 
imply that the assumption of symptom independence 
does not change the rank ordering of diseases, but it 
does effect the posterior probability distribution, so that 
the probabilities of diseases with p's over 0.5 are 
overestimated, and those with p's under 0.5 are underes­
timated. This would not be problematic for most com­
puter medical diagnostic systems that just come up with 
lists of likely diseases, but has serious implications if 
one is trying to perform patient management by weight­
ing utilities with accurate disease probabilities to find an 
optimum treatment. 
230 
2.2. ASSUMPTION OF SINGLE SYMPTOM · 
CAUSES 
In Bayes theorem causes of effects are held to be 
mutually exclusive. Each cause is assigned a prior pro­
bability or degree of belief, and when evidence is 
presented the degree of belief in a cause is incremented 
or decremented based on the ability of that cause to 
uniquely account for that evidence. When applied in 
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the medical domain, the usual practice is to map causes 
onto single diseases. Single, rather than multiple (or 
single and multiple), diseases are chosen as causes 
because: people have a better understanding of the 
mechanisms, and hence probabilities, of symptoms 
being produced by single diseases; the necessity of 
keeping track of the probability of all symptom combi­
nations given all disease combinations would make the 
combinatorial explosion even worse; and people have an 
understanding of the treatments that should be applied 
in the event of single, but not multiple, diseases. The 
problem with this assumption, like with the assumption 
of symptom independence, is that it violates real-world 
experience. Having two or more diseases co-occur in 
the same person is common, and treating one while 
ignoring the other may have serious medical conse­
quences. 
3. THE CAUSAL BAYESIAN MODEL 
The causal Bayesian approach allows most of the 
computational simplicity obtained from assuming symp­
tom independence, while providing a sensible way to 
model symptom interdependence. Symptoms of a 
disease that are int.ercorrelated are assumed to have an 
additional shared cause, besides the disease, which 
independent symptoms of the disease do not have. For 
example, anorexia (loss of appetite) and nausea, two 
symptoms of appendicitis, co-occur more frequently 
than would be expected by chance, because they both 
result from gastrointestinal disturbance. This additional 
cause, named a pathstate by Chamiak (1983), has itself 
a certain likelihood of being caused by the disease. 
(Our notion is derived from Charniak, but similar ideas 
have also been proposed by Pearl, 1985.) 
append 
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(!) C!U51l Bayes (b) Independent Symptoms 
Figure 1 
The symptoms of gastrointestinal disturbance, 
anorexia and nausea, cannot appear until appendicitis 
has produced the disturbance, but after iL is present, one 
or both symptoms may occur, relatively independently 
of the other. This is modeled by assuming that symp­
toms are independent with respect to proximal causes, 
which can be expressed computationally as follows: 
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p(anorexia & nausea/appendicitis) ,. 
p(anorexia/gi disturbance) p(nausea/gi disturbance) 
p(gi disturbance/appendicitis) 
In other words, the likelihood of a set of symptoms 
given a disease is equal to the product of the likelihoods 
of the symptoms given the pathstate directly causing 
them times the likelihood of the pathstate given the 
disease. (The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis, 
if additional pathstates and symptoms are added.) 
The contrast of the causal Bayesian approach 
with complete symptom independence is demonstrated 
by comparing Figures l (a) and l(b). In both figures, 
the likelihood of a gi disturbance given appendicitis is 
represented by p, the likelihood of anorexia given gi 
disturbance is represented by q, and the likelihood of 
nausea given gi disturbance is represented by . r. 
According to the causal Bayesian approach the probabil­
ity of anorexia and nausea both occurring given appen­
dicitis would be pqr, while according to complete symp­
tom independence it would be pqpr, making this unreal­
istically infrequent 
append 
agutro 
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Figure 2 
In our implementation a disease is represented by 
a hierarchical graph of a tree, expanding downwards, 
with the top node representing the disease, middle nodes 
representing pathstates, and bottom nodes representing 
symptoms. Figure 2 shows the representation we used 
for appendicitis. Links between nodes, which are only 
in a vertical direction, represent the probability of an 
child node being caused by its direct parent All the 
child nodes which are direct descendants of the same 
parent �e treated as probabilistically independent with 
respect to that parent The likelihood of the vector of 
symptom nodes, Zj, that are direct or indirect descen­
dants of a node x having any particular configuration of 
values, given x, is evaluated by the function "!hood" as 
follows: 
If (x is a symptom node) 
Then lhood(zjlx) := 1 
Else lhood(zj lx) := TI p (y; lx) lhood(zt ly; ) 
i=l 
Here, y; is a direct descendent of x, and-it is the symp­
tom vector of direct and indirect descendents of Y;. 
Individual symptoms can have values of present, absent, 
or unknown. Other than this new method for calculat­
ing likelihoods, the rest of Bayes theorem is used in the 
way described in the previous section. 
4. THE KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 
We started the project by locating an expert not­
able both for his medical knowledge and his sym­
pathetic attitude towards attempts to quantify the medi­
cal decision-making process. We decided to work on 
the problem of the differential diagnosis of appendicitis 
because it was circumscribed, had hard data available, 
and the large differences in utilities for the possible 
treatment options would put a premium on the correct 
assessment of disease probabilities. The first author 
spent several weeks reading the literature of the domain, 
and after extended discussion we chose to limit the 
modeling process to the six diseases with prior probabil­
ities higher than one percent that would be considered 
when diagnosing appendicitis. The final model also 
included 19 symptoms and 32 intermediate pathstates. 
(The hierarchical structures of the diseases were defined 
in PROLOG by the first author.) 
We developed the pathstate structure for the vari­
ous diseases by deciding which symptoms were causally 
related because they all were manifestations of a stress 
produced by the disease on a particular system, or 
organ, or at a particular location. In general, similar 
symptoms were interrelated in the same way for 
different diseases, simplifying the modeling process. 
Although the diseases that are commonly con­
fused with appendicitis may cause the same symptoms 
with the same probabilities, they can be diagnostically 
differentiated because they characteristically produce 
these symptoms at different times after the onset of the 
disease. Therefore, we needed to modify the pathstate 
models to allow diseases to evolve over time. We 
solved this problem by making the likelihood links 
between nodes conditional on the time since disease 
onset. This was done by having the expert graph the 
probability strength of each link as a function of time, 
from 0 to 132 hours. Even though drawing a line on a 
graph does not create a much larger time demand on the 
expert than making a point estimate, it provides much 
more information. In this way, we could generate likel­
ihoods for symptoms being produced by the various 
diseases at whatever time since onset that the symptoms 
were reported. (Time since disease onset was defined 
as time since first observed symptom.) 
Pathstates emerge from the expert's causal under­
standing of the disease process, but there is no indepen­
dent evidence of their existence. As scientists, we 
include them as hypothetical constructs in our models 
because they improve the quality of our explanations 
and predictions. However we were posing our expert 
the difficult question of assigning probabilities to the 
likelihood of diseases causing theoretical entities or the 
theoretical entities causing symptoms. To reassure our­
selves that he wasn't pulling these numbers from a hat, 
we devised a coherency check. We asked our expert to 
graph the direct likelihood of each symptom given 
appendicitis. These likelihoods should be both more 
reliable and better calibrated, because they are based on 
the empirical observation of symptoms and are con­
sistent with the way our expert is used to thinking about 
diseases. We could then compare these likelihoods with 
the likelihood of a symptom given a disease obtained 
from the model and correct the discrepancies. (The 
model defines the likelihood of a symptom given a 
disease as equal to the products of the likehoods linking 
all the nodes on a direct path from the symptom to the 
disease.) There was substantial overlap, although the 
model estimates tended to be lower than the direct ones 
(perhaps because the expert underestimated the effect of 
multiplying several likelihoods less than one when pro­
_viding the original pathstate probabilities). 
The knowledge engineering also involved obtain­
ing estimates for disease priors and treatment utilities 
from our expert. We found the priors to be conditional 
upon age and sex, so we repeated the technique of hav­
ing the expert draw graphs to show the change in 
disease probability with age. Some of the prior proba­
bilities of the gynecological diseases also varied accord­
ing to time of the month, so we also made a graph of 
these changes and used them to weight the age-based 
priors. (Afterwards, the prior probabilities across 
diseases were normalized.) Entering treatment utilities 
involved the related problems of finding one standard to 
measure utility and defining the treatment options. The 
�ventual options used were symptomatic treatment until 
recovery or an intraperitoneal operation (symptomatic 
treatment implies that an operation may be performed if 
the patient's condition declines). Utility was estimated 
in terms of morbidity, specifically, number of days in 
the hospital expected for a particular disease-treatment 
combination (mortality was not used as a measure of 
utility, because it is typically below one percent for all 
cases). 
5. IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL 
The rest of this section describes several compli­
cations that emerged when we tried to implement the 
model and the solutions we arrived at to resolve them. 
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5.1. MODEillG DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
SEVERITY 
One problem we encountered was that symptoms 
could be related without being simply independent with 
respect to one another, because they reflected different 
degrees of severity of the same stress. We solved this 
problem by adding an additional pathstate below the 
main one to represent each increasing level of severity 
that we wanted to model. Each pathstate had some pro­
bability of causing a direct de.scendant pathstate 
reflecting the next higher degree of severity. Pathstates 
at both levels could also directly cause symptoms, 
though not usually the same ones. For example, in Fig­
ure 2, the pathstate arlq reflects the presence of any 
right lower quadrant peritoneal signs including the most 
minor, tenderness. If the peritoneal signs reach 
moderate intensity, reflected by amodrlq being caused, 
then there should also be a high probability of observing 
·guarding. Finally, if the right lower quadrant peritoneal 
signs reached their most severe, shown by asevrlq, then 
rebound tenderness and ileus should appear u well. 
The advantage of this kind of structure is that it is 
impossible for the severe signs of a stress to occur 
without the mild ones, because the mild ones are caused 
by a pathstate directly caused by the disease. (Y/e 
would also expect the low severity pathstates and their 
symptoms to be present earlier than the high severity 
pathstates and theirs, because increasing severity 
evolves over time. This is relatively easy for us to 
model, because, as stated in the previous section, the 
likelihood links between pathstate nodes are conditioned 
on time.) 
5.2. COMPENSATING FOR SINGLE CAUSES OF 
SYMPTOMS 
Another serious problem to emerge was that not 
all symptoms we were looking at were caused by all the 
diseases in the hypothesis pool. Theoretically, the 
observation of a symptom uniquely caused by one of 
the diseases should categorically rule out the others. No 
doctor would perform a diagnosis on this basis. We 
might try to deal with this problem by relaxing the con­
dition that diseases be mutually exclusive and by adding 
other diseases thought to cause the symptoms, e.g., 
colds. We resisted this approach. It seemed reasonable 
to consider our six diseases to be mutually exclusive for 
the practical purpose of differentially diagnosing appen­
dicitis. Although any one of the symptoms we were 
considering might be caused by many different diseases, 
the co-occurrence of several of these symptoms in the 
patient would strongly suggest that the relevant disease 
was from the pool. And since the pool was so small, 
we felt that the chance of two diseases from within it 
occurring simultaneously to cause acute symptoms to be 
vanishingly small. 
The solution was to allow the possibility that 
symptoms could be independently caused by individual 
diseases from outside the pool and were co-occurring 
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with the diseases from within it. Accordingly, we had 
our expert graph a "base-rate" external-cause probability 
for each symptom by sex and age. The numerator of 
Bayes theorem would now become: 
I =II 
p(D;) lhood(Zj!D;) f1p(z1) 
1=1 
i.e., the prior probability of the disease times the likeli­
hood of the symptoms caused by the disease having a 
particular set of values, given the disease, times the 
independent probability of each symptom not caused by 
the disease having its particular value. D; represents 
any disease from the hypothesis pool, and z1 stands for 
any symptom included in the model not directly or 
indirectly caused by D;. The denominator becomes the 
sum of these expressions across diseases. 
Ouuide 
Disease A 
c:ause 
pf Disease B 
�ymptom caused by B 
Figure 3 
There are two ways that "base-rate" symptoms 
could co-occur with the diseases of the hypothesis pool 
and their symptoms, as shown in Figure 3. The entire 
upper rectangle in Figure 3 represents the probability of 
Disease A, and the entire lower rectangle represents the 
probability of Disease B. Disease B causes a symptom 
with a certain likelihood, represented by the lower half 
of Disease B, while Disease A does not cause it. There 
is also a certain probability of this symptom co­
occurring independently with each disease from outside 
causes, represented by the small vertical rectangles on 
the left sides of A and B. The probability of this symp­
tom given Disease A is simply equal to the symptom's 
overall "base-rate" probability, because Disease A and 
the symptom are independent. The probability of the 
symptom given Disease B involves two contributions, 
one from inside the disease and one from outside it. 
B ecause they are independent contributions, the wtal 
probability of the symptom given Disease B is equal to 
the probability of the symptom being caused by the 
disease, plus the probability of its being caused exter­
nally, minus the overlap. 
The same principle can be extended for each 
symptom that either is caused or not caused by a partic­
ular disease. However, for a symptom to be caused by 
a disease, there is a long causal chain to follow, any of 
whose links could break. In other words, a symptom 
could be absent just as easily from a paths tate not being 
caused by a disease as from a symptom not being 
caused by a pathstate. Conversely, any time there is a 
break in the causal chain, there is some probability that 
a given symptom could be independently caused. 
Therefore the revised ''lhood" function should include a 
probability for an independent symptom to be observed 
given all possible outcomes for the causal chain, either 
being intact or breaking at any given link. It is as fol­
lows: 
If (x is a symptom node) 
Then lhood(zj/x) := 1 
Else lhood(Zjix) := 
i=lt k=m 
fl [(p(yJx) lhood(-zllyi)) + ((1- p(yi/x)) rr p(Zt))] 
i=l .t=l 
Here p (zt) is the externally caused probability of a 
symptom descendant of node Yi having a value of 
present, absent, or unknown. The "base-rate" probabil­
ity assigned for a symptom Zt being absent is one 
minus the probability p (zt) of that symptom being 
present, and the value assigned for unknown status is 
one (so that the product in the numerator of Bayes 
theorem depends only on known symptoms). The term 
on the left side of the definition of "!hood" for disease 
and pathstate nodes remains unchanged from the previ­
ous definition. The term on the right side represents the 
probability of the set of descendant symptoms being 
observed in the absence of node Yi being caused. 
5.3. COMBil\1NG INFORMATION FROM TWO 
MEASUREMENTS 
6. TESTING THE MODEL 
We tested the ability of the model to distinguish 
the symptoms of 100 recorded cases of appendicitis 
from those of 100 recorded cases of nonspecific abdom­
inal pain. The cases were chosen to present a wide 
range of diagnostic difficulty, with some causing high 
probabilities of error for human diagnosticians and pre­
vious (Bayesian) diagnostic systems. For the test, we 
constructed a comparison independent Bayesian model 
which had the same likelihoods for individual symptoms 
being caused by a disease, but in which the probabilities 
of combinations of symptoms given a disease were 
obtained by multiplying their separate likelihoods, as in 
Figure 1(b). The probabilities of individual symptoms 
for the independent model were found by multiplying 
all the likehoods linking all the nodes on a direct path 
from the symptom to the disease in the pathstate model. 
This would provide a fair comparison; any difference in 
the performance of the models could not be attributed to 
tlte accuracy of the likelihoods of individual symptoms 
and must therefore depend on how tlte data about symp­
toms were combined. 
To accurately describe the test sample, we set the 
prior probabilities of appendicitis and non-specific 
abdominal pain to 0.5 in both models. We entered the 
symptoms of the cases into both models and obtained 
posterior probabilities of appendicitis for each case. An 
appropriate measure of performance is calibration, also 
known as "reliability in the small" (Yeats, 1982) . A 
person or decision-system is well calibrated if the pro­
bability she or it assigns to a given outcome occurs that 
with that frequency; for example, if 9 out of 10 abdomi­
nal cases that were assigned a 90% probability of of 
being appendicitis actually were appendicitis. (We are 
more interested in calibration than in maximizing 
discrimination between appendicitis and non­
appendicitis because good calibration allows maximum 
accuracy in placing diseases above or below the proba­
bility threshold for switching treatment options based on 
utility considerations. This threshold is rarely 0.5). 
The result, obtained using the jackknife statistical 
technique (Mosteller & Tukey, 1977), was that the cali­
bration of the causal Bayesian model (.0735) was supe­
rior to the independent model (.0785). The probability 
of this difference being due to chance was <.001. An 
alternative comparison using a measure of the area of 
error between a quadratic regression function fitted on 
the probabilities of the cases assigned by a particular 
model and the perfect calibration function also showed 
the causal model to be significantly superior. The 
results suggest that the causal Bayesian approach can 
provide a viable solution to tlte interdependence prob­
lem. 
These tests are described in more detail in 
Schwartz, Clarke, Baron, & deDombal (1986). A test 
of a conceptually similar causal Bayesian model which 
used objective probabilities to define the links between 
pathstates, but which did not allow for outside causes of 
symptoms", also showed a considerable improvement in 
calibration over an independent comparison model 
(Clarke, Schwartz, Baron, & deDombal, 1986). 
7. WORK IN PROGRESS 
Another problem that we have been considering 
is how to take advantage of symptom information from 
two different times. For example, a doctor learns about 
a first set of symptoms; noticed by the patient when he 
contracts a disease, and a second set of symptoms when 
the patient is examined. Between the two measure­
ments, symptom values may change in either direction. 
Given that one has a model of how various diseases 
evolve over time, these changing symptoms should be 
very diagnostic in distinguishing among diseases. 
Suppose the likelihood of a symptom given a 
disease increases over time. Four symptom patterns 
may be observed: yes-yes, yes-no, no-yes, or no-no. 
The two temporal measurements are not independent, 
because they reflect the operation of a single disease 
process. Probabilities may be assigned to these patterns 
by assuming a relationship of implication between likel­
ihoods. If a symptom is caused by a disease at a time 
when it is less likely to do so, then we must also expect 
it to occur when it is more likely. However, a symptom 
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occurring when it is more likely does not necessarily 
imply that it will occur when it is less likely. There­
fore, the probability of the yes-yes pattern may be 
defined as probability of the symptom at the less likely 
time. The yes-no pattern, with a symptom being 
observed at the less likely, but not more likely, time, is 
impossible and could only be produced by some outside 
cause. The no-yes pattern, with the symptom being 
observed only at the more likely time, has a probability 
equal to the difference between the likelihoods of the 
symptom at the more and less likely times. The proba­
bility of the no-no pattern is equal to one minus the 
likelihood of the symptom being caused at the more 
likely time. 
This logic can easily be extended to describe the 
temporal changes in the likelihood of any child node 
given its parent. A parallel representation describes 
how the four patterns can be accounted for by indepen­
dently caused symptoms. Work is proceeding to com­
plete the implementation of these additions and test 
them. 
At the same time, the first author is using the 
causal pathstate model of appendicitis described in the 
previous sections of this paper to compare the diagnos­
tic reasoning of expen and novice surgeons, as pan of 
his doctoral d issertation in Psychology at the University 
of Pennsylvania. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
There are several conclusions we would l ike to 
draw about the work we have described. We have tried 
to show that a Bayesian diagnostic system using subj ec­
tive causal links between intermediate states is feasible . 
Above that, the calibration results show that causal 
modeling is consequential, that is, it visibly improves 
performance over a Bayesian system based on the con­
ventional assumption of symptom independence . Once 
again, the lesson of Artificial Intelligence research is 
that a simple theoretical analysis of a problem does not 
reveal all the difficulties that arise during implem enta­
tion. We have found additional difficulties, not foreseen 
by Chamiak (1983), specifically: 
1) that symptoms take on different meanings 
because diseases evolve over time. 
2) that symptoms can be indirectly related, because 
they reveal d ifferent levels of severity of a patho­
logical condition. 
3) that not all the diseases in an hypothesis pool 
cause the same symptoms, so that it is necessary 
to allow symptoms to have external causes. 
Fortunately, these problems are soluble. 
The main advantage of this approach that we 
would like to emphasize is that unlike the current "hot" 
approaches for dealing with uncertainty in AI, 
MYCIN's certainty factors and Dempster-Shafer 
(Buchanan & Shonliffe, 1984; Shafer, 1976; Shontiffe, 
1976), the output of this system is real probabilities that 235 
can be used to weigh the utilities of teatment options for 
patient management. Other advanteges are that it solves 
the interdependence problem in a palatable way, is com­
putationally simple, and does not place an excessive 
demand for probability estimates on the expert. Given 
the theoretical justification for the Bayesian approach, 
there now seems to be no further excuse for neglecting 
it in the design of expen systems. 
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